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Despite the lukewarm reception it garnered when it was first 
published, Hayek’s The Constitution of Liberty (CL) has long 
since come to be established as a major classic. Taking wing 
from the argument presented in The Road to Serfdom—
i.e. a warning that the violations of individual freedom 
and the onset of despotism can come as a consequence of 
misguided central planning—Hayek articulates the form 
of government intervention that is most compatible with a 
free society. 
According to Hamowy, the editor of the last version of 
CL, “what he attempts is nothing less than laying bare the 
political machinery necessary for a free society, treated in 
both its historical and philosophical dimensions” (Hayek 
2011, p. 5). Hayek thoroughly investigates the nature of this 
kind of society, whose main characteristics result from the 
application of specific principles and values. Starting from 
more abstract considerations about the value of freedom and 
about its relation to other values such as tradition, reason, 
responsibility and equality, Hayek draws conclusions about 
the practical application of the value on actual policy 
options afforded by the welfare state. The main objective 
of this paper is to look to the practical application of this 
principle of freedom in the area of educational policy.
However, the concept of liberty as set out by Hayek is 
recognised by many as being somewhat problematic for 
the damaging effects it can produce in terms of individual 
rights. Taking these considerations into account, an 
alternative account is advanced by Wilhelm von Humboldt, 
who was considered by Hayek as “Germany’s greatest 
philosopher of freedom”. In his work The Limits of State 
Action (1854), Humboldt set out to discover “the legitimate 
objects to which the energies of state organizations should 
be directed” or, in other words, the limits that should guide 
the operations of government so that it can be restrained 
within its own legitimate sphere of operations. At the same 
time, he praises the instrinsic value of liberty and how it 
is essential for the proper development of the individual, 
thereby justifying the limitations of state interference. 
Starting from the idea that the “highest end” of individual 
man is the greatest development of one’s own capacities, 
Humboldt proceeds with an extensive analysis of the 
different areas of state intervention—which he refers to as 
“the solicitude of the state”—bringing to light the harmful 
effects to individual liberty. 
The question of how to assure that personal liberty is 
respected when government is performing its necessary 
activities through its institutions is the main concern 
of both Hayek and Humboldt and also the focus of this 
paper. After exploring what freedom means for Hayek1 and 
Humboldt, and after explaining the theoretical framework 
that is considered the only way possible to have government 
intervention compatible with the respect for individual 
liberty, we will discuss the practical application of the 
principle of liberty in the domain of education. Given the 
deep impact that education has on the citizenry, it is vital 
to be aware of the consequences of having an educational 
system entirely dependent on central organization.
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I. THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY
Liberty is defined as the prime value that determines a free 
society. By way of a first definition, Hayek affirms that a 
state of liberty is the one where “coercion of some by others 
is reduced as much as is possible in society” (2011, p. 57). 
Consequently, there are two main characteristics that assist 
in complementing the notion of liberty. The first concerns 
the practical application of the concept; a policy of liberty 
will be the one that “minimizes coercion or its harmful 
effects, even if it cannot eliminate it completely” (2011, p. 
59). The second characteristic of this notion of liberty is 
that it always involves interpersonal relations, a violation 
of which will always correspond to coercion exercised by 
another agent.
By emphasizing this aspect, Hayek intends to clarify this 
often poorly understood concept: liberty is not coextensive 
with the set of real possibilities from which it is possible to 
choose. Hayek writes: “In this sense “freedom” refers solely 
to a relation of men to other men, and the only infringement 
on it is coercion by men” (2011, p. 60). As such, to be free is 
not determined by the range of choice but by the possibility 
of choosing according to one’s own preferences and 
intentions, without anyone having the power to manipulate 
the course of action that will assure that person’s own 
satisfaction. The possibility of defining the most preferred 
action without being subjected to any exterior and arbitrary 
will is possible because to be free corresponds with having 
“some assured private sphere”, within which each person’s 
decisions are sovereign and within which no one else can 
interfere (2011, p. 61).
The definition of liberty as put forward by Hayek, as he 
himself recognises, is very close to the original meaning of 
the word, which emerges from the distinction between free 
men and non-free men or slaves. Since ancient times, being 
not free always meant to have to act, often arbitarily. To be 
free then consisted in being free from “the independence of 
the arbitrary will of another” (2011, p. 59).
“Liberty may be desirable, even though not all persons 
may take advantage of it” (2011, p. 68). As such, in many 
cases the benefits of freedom do not correspond to visible 
opportunities recognised by everyone as favourable effects, 
but rather to the imposition of a certain discipline in acting 
according to one’s own choices that may be considered 
more an obligation than an advantage. Hayek writes: 
“liberty does not mean all good things or the absence of all 
evils. It is true that to be free may mean freedom to starve, 
to make costly mistakes, or to run mortal risks” (2011, 
pp. 68-69). To better understand this possibility it may be 
useful to consider certain religious orders whose members 
are cloistered and dedicate most of their day to prayers, or 
orders where fasting is a common practice. In such cases, 
provided these individuals have not been forced to follow 
such a way of life, it is not possible to affirm that either there 
is not freedom or that such ways of life should be forbidden 
in a free society. Following this rationale, coercion should 
be thus be understood as the elimination of free action, a 
function of individual exercise of intellect and knowledge. 
In other words, coercion corresponds to situations in which 
the individual is forced to act according to the purposes and 
intents of another rather than one’s own.
After analysing the meaning and main characteristics of 
the concept of liberty, the foundation of a truly free society, 
Hayek analyses the emergence of the value and the different 
interpretations of ‘freedom’ made by different theorists.
Liberty, Hayek posits, did not emerge by human 
design, even though it is an “artifact of civilization” and 
attributable to the state of nature. Institutions of liberty and 
all their creations were not implemented a priori regarding 
the advantages they would bring. Nevertheless, when the 
benefits of those institutions started to be recognised, and 
with the expansion of this “reign of liberty”, people began 
to examine the details of how these free societies operate.
Within this context, two main expressions of liberty 
were developed: one emerged in England and Scotland and 
the other in France. According to Hayek, these two theories 
were fundamentally different: the former is characterised as 
being “empirical and unsystematic”, the later is considered 
“speculative and rationalistic”. Moreover, the theory of 
liberty that emerged in England and Scotland understood 
traditions  and institutions as the result of spontaneous 
growth, of interaction, and about which our knowledge is 
necesarily imperfect. This outlook was mainly associated 
with the Scottish Enlightenment of David Hume and 
Adam Smith but also to a degree included Irishman 
Edmund Burke. On the other hand, the tradition of liberty 
originating in France considered that the powers of human 
reasonwere unlimited, being thus possible for a utopian 
state to be achieved. Even though it was “an attempt to 
interpret British institutions” (2011, p. 109), the French 
tradition ended up having greater influence during the mid-
twentieth century, perhaps due to its emotional/rationalistic 
appeal to perfectability and human pride.
One of the most evident differentiating characteristics of 
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essence of liberty, and what is considered to be the role of 
liberty in the evolution and operation of the social order. 
Hayek invokes J. L. Talmon to better clarify this distinction: 
“One finds the essence of freedom in spontaneity and the 
absence of coercion, the other believes it to be realized 
only in the pursuit and attainment of an absolute collective 
purpose”. Moreover, the British tradition of liberty 
connotes “organic, slow, half-conscious growth” and for 
“trial and error procedure”, while the French tradition of 
liberty stands for “doctrinaire deliberateness” and for “an 
enforced solely valid pattern” (2011, p. 111).
Given the alternatives, Hayek is emphatic in concluding 
that the British tradition of liberty establishes the 
foundations of a theory that is “profound and essentially 
valid” whereas the French tradition puts forward a vision 
that is “completely wrong” (2011, p. 112). The validity of the 
interpretation of British philosophers is so profound that 
it can actually be traced back to ancient Greek and Roman 
civilizations. Both Athens and Rome attained success due 
to the accumulated experience of many men and of many 
generations, allowing for successful laws, institutions and 
traditions to persist for general convenience and not due 
to the decisions of a rationalistic mind set. A multitude 
of actions whose objectives were frequently not very 
clear, ceded origin to institutions with specific purposes 
according to their own needs. In this context, social order 
emerged as “the result of adaptive evolution”, not being a 
deliberate product of a “higher, supernatural intelligence” 
(2011, p. 115). Social evolution thus happens through 
successive learning processes of trial and error and of 
imitation of the most convenient practices: “institutions 
whose significance we might discover by analysis but which 
will also serve men’s ends without men’s understanding 
them” (2011, p. 118). The evolution of the social order 
is not the outcome of intellectual or moral attributes 
inherited by men, and for this reason it is not possible to 
shape civilization as they see fit. Hayek sums it up: “For in 
social evolution, the decisive factor is not the selection of 
the physical and inheritable properties of the individuals 
but the selection by imitation of successful institutions 
and habits” ( .). This “evolutionist” British tradition of 
liberty is very close to the Christian tradition of human 
imperfection and fallibility, the idea being that intelligence 
is limited by one's inclination to sin—precisely the opposite 
is contended by the rationalist tradition.
Therefore, the fundamental difference between both 
traditions of liberty can be found, Hayek asserts, on 
the interpretation of the importance of traditions and 
other cultural products that emerged without previous 
deliberation. This distinction is emphasized by Hayek, 
who clearly affirms that rationalists will end up becoming 
“enemies of freedom” for not being able to conceive of the 
existence of institutions that serve human purposes but 
that were neither consciously  planned nor deliberately 
implemented. However paradoxical it may seem, Hayek 
notes that the true and free society will always be a 
“tradition-bound society” with a strong connection to the 
experience of different generations and to the spontaneous 
growth of certain socio-cultural habits.
The elements constituting accumulated knowledge and 
inherited experience of past generations include not only 
institutions, habits and even tools, but also the rules of 
conduct “which have grown as part of it, which are both a 
product and a condition of freedom” (2011, p. 123). These 
types of rules allow for establishing a behaviour pattern 
that brings some regularity to the action of men, despite the 
absence of commands or coercion that determine that same 
action. Hayek goes a little further in this argument and 
explains that the general and voluntary observation of these 
rules of conduct will actually result in the establishment of 
a certain social order, and that therefore it is not necessary 
to coercively impose rules. Nevertheless, it is also very 
important for these rules of conduct to have a certain 
certain level of flexibility going to be used by individuals 
to test them and even to break them. Occasionally, these 
attempts are going to lead to changes and improvements, 
demonstrating the mechanism through which civilization 
progresses.
Nonetheless, Hayek emphasizes that his argument in 
defence of the British tradition of liberty does not intend 
to be an absolutely devastating critique of reason. “Reason 
undoubtedly is man’s most precious possession” (2011, 
p. 130), but he adds that this is precisely the motive that 
underlies the necessity of avoiding its abusive application. 
Reason must thus be used in combination with intelligence 
and some control essential to understanding the extent 
of the complexity of society and also that its healthy 
functioning is the result of the interaction of forces that 
are mostly unknown. For this reason and also because it 
is impossible to predict all the consequences of human 
interventions, any effort made to improve the social order 
should happen incrementally, thereby respecting the 
accumulated experience and knowledge.
As previously mentioned, despite having made a most 
salient contribution to the debate, the concept of freedom 
put forward by Hayek was not unanimously accepted and 












gave rise to a protracted debate between Hayek and his 
critics, about whom we can only make brief mention. Ronald 
Hamowy (1981) was one of the authors who unpacked 
the concept and found that, although it defines a limited 
private area where the individual is sovereign, it may not be 
enough to assure that private liberty is fully respected by 
society. Hamowy, the editor of CL, later argued that to have 
freedom defined simply as the absence of coercion may be 
“fundamentally incompatible” with what is the best of the 
tradition of libertarianism.
According to Hamowy, this definition poses a difficulty 
in the lack of clarity in the distinction between coercive 
and non-coercive acts. Hayek describes the former as being 
the rendering of those services that are not crucial for the 
existence of an individual or for the preservation of that 
which the individual most values. However, the precise 
meaning of the concepts “crucial to the existence” and 
“preservation of what is most valued” leaves broad scope 
for including a number of situations in this definition 
of coercion that may make little sense.2 Moreover, these 
same difficulties remain when the question of coercion is 
analysed under the perspective of state intervention, where 
freedom is to act under abstract and general rules equally 
applicable to all, without any form of discrimination—this 
form of governance is commonly called the Rule of Law. 
Within this context, Hayek considers that both taxation 
and conscription may not be seen as acts of coercion, since 
“they are predictable and enforced irrespective of how the 
individual would otherwise employ his energies” (2011, 
p. 210). 
For Hamowy and other critics of this conception of 
freedom, this is precisely that which is most problematic 
in Hayek’s failure to clearly distinguish between coercive 
and non-coercive acts. It gives numerous opportunities 
for interference in the individual lives of each member 
of society, including the potential for basic rights to be 
violated.3
According to Hamowy (1981) “it would be just as 
consistent, within a free society governed by the Rule of 
Law, to interfere with many of our most basic freedoms … 
provided such laws are applicable to all without distinction”. 
Faced with these critiques, Hayek promptly clarified some 
points he considered were misinterpreted. According to 
him, the first is related to the primary concern of the thesis 
of CL, which was not how to completely eliminate coercion 
but how to reduce it as much as possible. Hayek asserts that 
“to prevent people from coercing others is to coerce them”, 
a minimum level of coercion is always needed. In grasping 
the difference between coercive and noncoercive acts an act 
of coercion always leaves the coerced person in a position 
that is worse than the position previously held. On the 
contrary, if a change in the environment of a person adds 
to his own range of choice, then it cannot be considered 
an act of coercion. Lastly, the boundaries of the concept 
are better clarified by Hayek when he emphasizes that the 
government is only allowed to exercise coercion to prevent 
coercion in those cases required by general rules, which are 
“known beforehand” and that are “equally applicable to 
all”. With these three main points, Hayek attempts to refute 
his critics by rejecting the idea that his analysis of coercion 
opens the door to numerous violations of the private sphere 
by government.
Bearing in mind the ambiguities and the limitations of 
the concept of liberty and the misinterpretation of coercion 
it would be useful to look for an alternative concept of 
freedom. Following Hayek's lead, we now turn our attention 
to the German philosopher Wilhelm von Humboldt.
The concept of freedom is defined by Humboldt in 
The Limits of State Action (1854) as being simply “the 
possibility of a various and indefinite activity” (p. 4), which 
is fundamentally associated with the individual and with 
his respective peculiarities. Henceforth, higher levels of 
freedom can only be achieved, according to Humboldt, 
where there is corresponding progress in civilizational 
results from the interaction amongst an increasing variety 
of individual resources and capacities. Nonetheless, 
when taking into consideration the history of political 
organizations, it becomes clear that the freedom of citizens 
has often been limited either for reasons related to “the 
necessity of organizing or securing the constitution” or 
for reasons related to “the expediency of providing for the 
moral and physical condition of the nation”  (1854, p. 6). It is 
for this reason, Humboldt concludes, there is an important 
correlation between the freedom of private life and public 
freedom, with one always increasing in exact proportion as 
the other declines, the causes and consequences of which 
need to be further analysed.
Liberty is an essential precondition for personal growth 
that permits the development of one’s own capacities and 
singular characteristics and that ultimately results in “the 
decreasing necessity of acting in large, compacted masses” 
(1854, p. 5). For Humboldt, the “true end of man” is 
precisely this process of self-cultivation and self-realization, 
“the highest and most harmonious development of his 
powers to a complete and consistent whole” (1854, p. 12). 
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this individual potential can only be realized when citizens 
freely relate to or cooperate with other fellow citizens. 
These free interactions benefit not only the individual, who 
becomes more valuable to himself for being able to live a 
satisfying life, but also the society as a whole, because 
others can take advantage of and learn from each one’s 
unique talents.
Nonetheless, for this “self-culture” arrangement to pro-
duce the expected positive effects, it is important for the 
state to have a reduced sphere of intervention. Any extended 
form of state action will end up imposing a pattern of 
uniformity and hindering the variety of situations crucial 
for individual flourishing and for self-realization. Therefore, 
the role of the state as understood by Humboldt is simply 
“the maintenance of security, as well with regard to the 
attacks of foreign enemies as to the danger of internal 
discord” (1854, p. 54). This legitimate public realm must 
constitute the purpose of the state action in a free society, 
for without security, individuals will not be able to develop 
their own capacities nor to live a fulfilling life. Freedom 
cannot exist without security and to maintain that security 
is the purpose of the state. Any other interference in private 
affairs, even if aiming at facilitating the process of self-
realization “should be absolutely condemned” (1854, p. 20).
II. LIBERTY APPLIED IN EDUCATION
Having analysed the theoretical framework that surrounds 
the value of freedom in both Hayek and Humboldt it is now 
important to understand the way in which these authors see 
the operation of state agencies compatibility with respect to 
the sphere of the individual. For the purposes of this paper, 
we shall only focus on the emergence of social order in the 
field of education.
According to Hayek, education was made compulsory 
following the recognition of the value of knowledge and 
of the benefits of expanding its use to tackle ignorance. 
Aminimum standard of compulsory education was thus 
established taking into consideration two main arguments: 
a) that the entire community would be exposed to less risks 
and to more benefits if everyone shared a common basic level 
of knowledge, and b) that literacy is an essential element 
for the healthy functioning of democratic institutions and 
of the democratic regime itself (2011, p. 499). However, 
education is not a mere tool for transmitting concrete skills 
and knowledge, it is also a mechanism for providing a 
common set of values and behaviour patterns. For Hayek, 
this later role actually constitutes the main function of 
education and it is precisely here that the public system of 
education may also constitute a real danger to the principle 
of individual liberty. Despite the general acceptance of the 
idea that education would bring “additional knowledge” 
that would thus encourage “the conquest of ignorance”, 
Hayek contends that there is no single proof that the 
general availability for all of a higher level of knowledge 
would result in a better society. He writes, “knowledge 
and ignorance are very relative concepts, and there is little 
evidence that the difference in knowledge which at any one 
time exists between the more and the less educated of a 
society can have such a decisive influence on its character” 
(Hayek 2011, p. 500).
Regardless of these reservations, Hayek accepted the 
general argument in favour of compulsory education but 
reflects on the fundamental necessity of deciding how it is 
to be provided. As for the details of education provision, 
Hayek asserts that even though it might be difficult to 
impose a general level of education on people that are not 
completely convinced of and familiarized with its benefits, 
there should be absolutely no motive nowadays for having 
education institutions fully managed by the government, 
despite being funded publicly. Taking into account the 
arguments in favour of compulsory education, the role 
of the government may limited to a part of education; 
namely, on what determines the common set of values 
and patterns of behaviour. A wider and more centralised 
role from government poses a serious possibility of 
transforming education into a sphere “dominated by the 
theories of a particular group who genuinely believe that 
they have scientific answers to all problems” (Hayek 2011, 
p. 502). This situation would be very similar to that 
described under the French theory of liberty, where reason 
is regarded as the tool to achieve perfection and which 
will ultimately transform its defenders into “enemies of 
freedom”. 
Where the government has the monopoly of the 
management and provision of educational services, there 
are plenty of opportunities for enforcing that which is 
considered the only valid and supposedly perfect pattern 
of conduct, defined by what Hayek had previously called 
“doctrinaire deliberateness”. 
Bearing in mind that education may be an instrument 
through which the human mind can be deliberately shaped, 
it urges the government to assume, at least in the field of 
education policy, a function of supervision and protection 
rather than of provision. Hayek (2011, p. 503) writes: 
“Indeed, we may soon find that the solution has to lie in 












government ceasing to be the chief dispenser of education 
and becoming the impartial protector of the individual 
against all uses of such newly found powers” (Hayek 2011, 
p. 503). As such, to have the government as the “dispenser 
of education” is the only arrangement compatible with 
the British theory of liberty, a social order that respects 
the spontaneous growth of certain habits that have been 
resilient over the passage of time. To avoid the central and 
deliberate planning of every single aspect of the education 
system constitutes the most adequate arrangement for 
respecting personal liberty in providing this service. 
Leaving the government solely with a supervisory role 
allows for the durability of the most convenient institutions, 
i.e. those that better address the needs and purposes of the 
members of society and not those decided by a hardened 
rationalistic mind. 
Humboldt recognizes that modern states, following 
the concrete demands of the population, are increasingly 
directing their efforts to the improvement of the positive 
welfare of the nation. The means used for this purpose, laws 
and regulations that aim at promoting economic activity 
or remedying and preventing natural disasters, all have 
a common feature: “they are positively hurtful in their 
consequences, and wholly irreconcilable with a true system 
of polity” (1854, p. 22).
The institutions through which the state exercises 
its power to improve the physical welfare of people are 
characterized by a number of elements that limit the 
“variety of situations” that are fundamental for the 
development of human capacities. Humboldt enumerates 
the characteristics by explaining that these institutions 
are subjected to a “spirit of governing” that imposes on 
individuals a certain pattern of behaviour that is uniform 
and unnatural. Humboldt writes (1854, p. 23): “The very 
variety arising from the union of numbers of individuals 
is the highest good which social life can confer, and 
this variety is undoubtedly merged into uniformity in 
proportion to the measure of state interference”. This 
uniformity, or “common resemblance”, the result of the 
constrained actions of individuals, can be identified not 
only in the performed activities themselves but also in 
the results of such activities. A second consequence is the 
impact they have on the resources and will-power of an 
entire population. When the state agency prescribes a law 
or implements a measure, individuals tend to perceive it 
as an external imposition, as something somehow distant 
even though it may affect them directly, and they do 
not feel a special attachment either to its content or to its 
consequences. And this carries over to  the future: “the 
man who frequently submits the conduct of his actions to 
foreign guidance and control, becomes gradually disposed 
to a willing sacrifice of the little spontaneity that remains to 
him” (Humboldt 1854, p. 26). As such, there is a dangerous 
promotion of dependency on the state and a consequent 
reduction of active energy and effort that individuals put on 
their daily lives. Humboldt explains that “he now conceives 
himself not only irresponsible for the performance of any 
duty which the state has not expressly imposed upon him, 
but exonerated at the same time from every personal effort 
to ameliorate his own condition” (ibid.). An additional 
pernicious  consequence of institutions designed by the state 
to improve the positive welfare of citizens is related to their 
general character, which prevents individual cases from 
being addressed.Within this context Humboldt includes the 
topic of national education, which he quickly identifies in 
the title of the chapter as “an institution for reforming the 
mind and character of the citizen”. According to Humboldt, 
all the difficulties that result from institutions that are 
designed to promote the positive welfare of the citizen are 
also observed in the case of education. However, the case 
is more serious and its implications are more complex if we 
consider that the main purpose of education is to develop 
the individual. As such, national education promotes a 
single form of development and imposes a definite form on 
personal development, which constitutes a strong contradic 
tion in itself, since that will form individuals that are merely 
social clones. 
 National education, Humboldt claims, “leads at once to 
utter torpidity and stagnation, or a depression or deficiency 
of energy” (1854, p. 69) and instead of supporting the 
diversity of peculiarities, ends up repressing individual 
impulses and produces a general sedateness. On the 
contrary, private education is seen by the Humboldt as 
a better alternative, since it takes into consideration and 
shows greater respect for the characteristics of individuals. 
A multiplicity of relations and combinations between 
individuals and their peculiar features can only emerge 
without the unity of organization by via state agency.
Despite clearly failing to comply with the objective of 
developing the individual by imposing a uniform behaviour 
pattern and repressing the spontaneous development of 
faculties, Humboldt suggests that a system of guardians 
or family training would suffice, provided that the state 
would be able to intervene to prevent lack of resources 
or negligence (1854, pp. 69-71). Humboldt reiterates that 
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the proposed objectives, “it effects too much” and, for 
that reason, it lies “wholly beyond the limits within which 
political agency should be properly confined” (1854, pp. 71-
72).
As indicated, whenever the state positively promotes 
the welfare of its citizens, the spontaneous development of 
individuality is significantly hindered. Humboldt writes: 
“A political community, organized and governed according 
to this system, resembles rather an accumulated mass of 
living and lifeless instruments of action and enjoyment, 
than a multitude of acting and enjoying powers” (1854, 
p. 42). The government should be restricted to the protection 
of individual characteristics: a spontaneous cultural order 
is encouraged to emerge. 
The political structure as defended by Hayek and 
Humboldt's spontaneous order embodies the values of 
cooperation and formal equality between individuals. 
Being an element of civil society, education not only allows 
for the generation of spontaneous orders but is also assisted 
by them.
According to the characteristics of a spontaneous order 
as put forward by diZerega, the face-to-face cooperation 
that emerges within this arrangement “enables individually 
and tacit knowledge to be employed effectively in pursuing 
new plans and goals” (diZerega 2008, p. 3). This is precisely 
what happens if education is organised following the 
arguments defended by Hayek and Humboldt: parents 
and children are allowed to follow the plans that better 
address their interests and necessities by deploying their 
own knowledge in decision-making.Another important 
feature identified by diZerega is the fact that, despite being 
biased towards some concrete values, the abstract rules that 
structure spontaneous orders, do not define any specific 
objective to be pursued within their arrangement. In the 
case of education, when the government abstains from 
monopolising the management and provision of education, 
the respect for individuality and the equality of status, 
guide the educational process of children. Nonetheless, 
the combination of these two values does not define every 
single feature of the education system. There is a large 
number of possibilities to be chosen according to individual 
knowledge about the most adequate plan to address 
different needs and interests identified by those involved 
in the process. In diZerega’s work, actors define the success 
or failure of a spontaneous order by providing feedback 
signals to other actors to assist them in operating within 
the system. A similar dynamic takes place when a diversity 
of schools is allowed to implement their own projects to 
compete with other schools, with the most successful 
being those that are able attract more students by offering 
a programme that better fits their interests and needs. 
However, this system of education is not a pure spontaneous 
order. It is founded on an organization that defines the 
general operating rules and then monitors them to provide 
a service that cannot be understood as a mere consumed 
product. Education does not have a client in the simple 
sense of consumers as in diZerega’s pure spontaneous 
order. The clients are students and children who need to be 
defended against some features of the market, which would 
be the result of its natural impersonal character, through 
the implementation of different mechanisms. On the one 
hand, these mechanisms may be of a procedural nature, 
such as independent inspections to evaluate the conditions 
of schools and national-based exams to assess the academic 
performance of students or the  legal protections of teachers 
that are employed at schools.
On the other hand, they may have deep moral concerns, 
so as to avoid the establishment of schools with projects that 
segregate children according to irrelevant distinguishing 
characteristics. 
Lastly, it is also important to note that to develop as 
a spontaneous order, education may also be affected by 
the misapplication of local knowledge, which can leave 
individuals in a least-favoured position to achieve their 
objectives. As diZerega (2008, p. 5) rightly points out, when 
actions are based on misleading information “coordination 
breaks down because the order becomes disconnected from 
the concrete circumstances that sustain it”. In order to avoid 
these informational asymmetries in the spontaneous order, 
that integrate the education system, there are conditions 
that must be taken into account when implementing 
concrete education policies based on the ideas advanced by 
Hayek and Humboldt.
III. CONTEMPORARY EXAMPLES OF LIBERTY  
 IN EDUCATION
For the past several decades, in respect of personal freedom, 
different mechanisms which fall under the umbrella of 
“school choice” were developed and implemented. Milton 
Friedman is considered the theorist most associated with 
school vouchers, one of the most well-known mechanisms 
to implement choice. Following the acknowledgement that 
the tasks of funding and providing education could coexist 
separately, Friedman suggests the government issue parents 
vouchers to be spent at the school of their choice (Friedman 












1955). In providing an equal opportunity for every child to 
attend any school, the principle of liberty in this mechanism 
is reflected in two different dimensions. On the one hand, 
new and different schools will arise and individuals will be 
able to choose from a set of different schools for the kind of 
education they consider to better fits their own needs and 
interests. On the other hand, such diversity will act as a 
bulwark against the imposition of a uniform and collective 
pattern of conduct.
In addition to these positive aspects, there other 
advantages inherent in the operation of the free market 
identified in these education mechanisms. If individuals 
or parents, have the freedom to choose any school and if 
the school only receives funding on a per-pupil basis, then 
schools will compete with each other to attract as many 
students as possible. Choice has both an instrumental 
and an intrinsic value, in that it gives a strong incentive 
to providers to improve the quality and efficiency of their 
services so as to not be financially penalized due to the 
loss of students at other schools (Le Grand 2007). Another 
important advantage of an educational system based on the 
idea of individual liberty isthe gains on the level of equality 
of opportunity since the most disadvantaged children get 
the opportunity to attend different schools and to improve 
their educational performance.
Despite these advantages, a system of education that is not 
fully managed by the government and that allows for the 
participation of private actors in the provision of services 
does have its critics for whom this arrangement raises 
serious moral concerns. Their main concern is associated 
with social justice and lies in the risk of racial segregation 
that they assume will take place when the most advantaged 
families which have more resources to take more informed 
decisions, secure places at the most popular schools, leaving 
the less successful schools to the most disadvantaged 
children (Tooley et al. 2003). In an article empirically 
testing the assumption that schools privately managed 
provide higher quality education, Smith and Meier (1995, 
pp. 475-476) conclude that there is “strong support for the 
cream-skimming hypothesis and nothing to support the 
demand for quality assumption” and that “choice has real 
potential to exacerbate the already considerable problems 
of de facto segregation in the public system”. Moreover, 
school choice is usually strongly opposed by teachers and 
their unions with the argument that the pressure of market-
mechanisms is going to have a negative impact on their own 
performance. According to educators, teaching is a vocation 
and an activity that should not be concerned solely with 
financial gain or financial efficiency and, for this reason, to 
use economic criteria to assess a teacher’s performance will 
not assure the quality of the service provided. As a result 
teachers argue that this means reduced job security, lower 
salaries and fewer opportunities for career progression 
(Hill, Rainey and Rotherham 2006). Another criticism 
often made that is often made is related to the possibility of 
choice fundamental to the concept of liberty as put forward 
by Hayek and Humboldt. According to such critics, people 
are not genuinely interested in making such choices, as long 
as the quality of the service is good; choice is a concern 
for those who have the resources to choose carefully, they 
argue (Le Grand 2007). This possibility of choice and the 
exit mechanism associated with it raise a concern about 
private interest being put ahead of public interest, since by 
choosing to leave a certain school, parents “weaken[ing] 
those schools for everyone else by taking away money and 
reducing the school’s political capital” (Hill and Jochim 
2009, p. 11).
Some of these limitations are recognised as potential 
problems by those who defend the respect for personal 
freedom in the provision of publicly funded education. 
Racial segregation is usually discounted by school choice 
advocates in that this problem is not caused by market 
mechanisms but derived from the traditional concept of 
‘catchment areas’.4 Empirical evidence collected by Jay 
P. Greene and Nicole Mellow (1998) suggest that in not 
attaching attendance to residence, private schools are 
more likely to succeed at promoting racial integration 
than public schools. In a more recent analysis regarding 
the Swedish system, Kristian Tiger stated (Hlavac 2007) 
that competition policies and open access actually reduced 
racial segregation at schools, by contrast to what the old 
centralised system was fostering.
Furthermore, choice offers an opportunity for children 
who are usually limited to a poor-quality schooling to 
attend another school their parents consider to be a better 
fit. In fact, even in those cases where segregation remains, 
there are studies suggesting that its impact is mitigated by 
the benefits those children enjoy from attending a school 
with additional resources (Jones-Sanpei 2006). As for the 
concerns raised by teachers, those who argue in favour of 
school choice reject the idea that working conditions will 
be worsened and argue that teachers employed under a 
market-logic will have the very same legal protections. 
Moreover, they also argue that under this arrangement, 
teachers will have stronger incentives to invest more in their 
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based on specific competences and performance. Choice 
proponents recognise that the mechanisms of choice may 
result in lower salaries because they will be paid according 
to a fixed-budget, dependent on the number of students 
enrolled, and because these schools face the necessity of 
being financially viable. However, this is seen only as a 
temporary setback which will be offset with the increase 
in the number of students attracted (Hill, Rainey and 
Rotherham 2006). Finally, the argument about the conflict 
between private and public  interests is easily contradicted 
even by the self-evident view that no public interest can be 
served with children being trapped in poor-quality schools.
Additionally, choice advocates have developed a set of 
conditions that must be respected and implemented to 
have unintended consequences reduced to a minimum. 
As Le Grand (2007) describes: firstly, competition must be 
real and that implies not only the existence of a set of valid 
alternatives (and no barriers to access the market) but also 
that the funding follows the children, so that schools can 
feel the consequences of not being chosen as an incentive 
to improve. A second condition is related to the process 
of choice itself: in order for parents to make as informed 
decisions as informed as possible, and also to mitigate 
potential information asymmetries, they must be provided 
with assistance through school catalogues or advising 
offices. Finally, Le Grand argues that in order to assure 
that deliberate selection of students does not take place, 
every school should adopt a first-come-first-served based 
admissions policy.
Another important pro-market proposal associated with 
school reform is the creation of charter schools, a movement 
that has been established in the United States for more 
than two decades. Charter schools are public schools that 
emerged from the development of a contract (or a charter) 
between the official state body responsible for education 
and the community. This charter defines the objectives to 
be achieved and criteria for which the school will be held 
accountable in terms of student achievement, but also allows 
for schools to have a considerable degree of autonomy and 
independence concerning their own organization.5
Charter schools bring teachers, parents and students 
together to provide the most adequate educational tools 
for children to be able to learn according to their own 
necessities, characteristics and interests. Teachers and 
school leaders are allowed to be more innovative and to 
adjust the curriculum and the materials in the service of 
students’ special needs. Moreover, parents are also invited 
to be more involved in the education of their own children, 
being able not only to contribute to the design of the school 
curriculum, but also to participate on the development of 
the school culture and ethos. For this reason, diversity is a 
key characteristic of charter schools, it being thus possible 
to find schools dedicated to specific themes or subjects, 
which find schools dedicated to specific themes or subjects, 
which go from STEM to the performing arts or college/
vocational preparation.
As public schools, charter schools are free and funded 
by local, state and federal taxes according to the number of 
students they attract, and are forbidden to charge tuition 
fees. Moreover, these schools cannot apply any special 
entrance requirements.
Similar to the voucher system, the creation and current 
expansion of charter schools is controversial, its critics 
being mainly concerned with social justice and social 
segregation. In addition to the criticisms previously 
described, opponents of charter schools usually accuse 
philanthropists of promoting free-market ideology, with 
the supposed intention of destroying public schools and 
destabilizing teachers’ unions.
Another criticism frequently made of schools managed 
or created by groups of individuals driven by different 
motivations is the concern about the values that will 
compose the ethos of the school and that will guide 
the education provided. Taking these arguments into 
consideration, central governments are responsible for 
the crucial initial step in the whole process of establishing 
schools under this model. As already mentioned, state 
authorities run a thorough check on applications for new 
schools in order to avoid the establishment of schools that 
may endanger the set of basic and common values that 
sustain a liberal-democracy.
School choice mechanisms have lately been the subject of 
many studies and cross-country empirical analyses to assess 
their value. One of the most recent evaluations of school 
vouchers in the United States was conducted by Miron and 
Urschel (2016), who made an analysis of 14 studies of the 
impact of voucher programmes on students’ achievement. 
According to them, there is a general “moderate” effect on 
the academic achievement of the participants in the voucher 
programmes. Seven studies presented mixed findings6 and 
the other seven presented positive findings, with none of 
the studies finding a negative impact on students covered 
by voucher programmes. Moreover, Shakeel, Anderson and 
Wolf (2016, p. 2) found “positive and statistically significant 
achievement effects of school vouchers” from a meta-
analysis of evidence from selected international randomized 












controlled trials evaluating the test scores of participants in 
such programmes. They concluded that this positive impact 
varies according to a number of factors,  being more evident 
in reading tests, for programmes outside the US (Colombia 
or India) and for publicly-funded programmes. Currently, 
in the United States, nearly 3 million children are being 
educated in schools established under a charter. The 
latest academic studies published concluded that students 
in charter schools perform better than their peers in 
traditional public schools with a better job being also done 
with least advantaged and minority background children.7 
Berends (2015) found that the studies on the effects of these 
schools show mixed results in terms of school achievement, 
but are consistently positive in terms of school attainment. 
In an article reviewing 25 years of these types of school, 
Berends concluded that despite great variations, charter 
schools are a positive experience, particularly in increasing 
high school graduation rates and college retention rates. 
In England, schools funded by the government but 
managed privately are called Academies or Free Schools 
and due to their relatively recent implementation, the data 
regarding their performance is still scarce. Nonetheless, by 
looking at the inspections made by Ofsted,8 it is possible 
to infer that this school choice mechanism has been very 
important in improving the quality of English schools: 27% 
of Free Schools inspected in September 2015 were rated 
as Outstanding, comparing to only 17% of maintained 
schools. Since 2010, 65% of schools that were rated as 
Inadequate and closed as a maintained school are now rated 
Good or Outstanding after being converted in an Academy 
(Bolton 2016; DfE 2017).
IV. CONCLUSION
The main objective of this paper has been to consider the 
concepts of liberty as put forward by Hayek and Humboldt
in understanding how liberty could be applied in the 
context of a specific public policy—education—respecting 
the spontaneous character of social orders.
Both Hayek and Humboldt agree that there is no 
plausible justification for having a centralized national 
system of education and that education models should be 
allowed to develop more spontaneously, provided that 
some basic criteria are assured. The individual, in order to 
maintain his single characteristics and faculties, needs to 
be able to freely interact with other individuals, to establish 
relations and to be exposed to “a variety of situations”. In 
the provision of education, this can be facilitated when 
some of the main characteristics of spontaneous orders are 
adopted, with individuals using their local knowledge to 
achieve the objectives they consider the most essential to 
their necessities and interests. By contrast, when the state 
assumes a monopoly based on doctrinaire deliberateness, 
these conditions so important for individual development,
are unlikely to be achieved. Individuals thus become mere 
social clones without energy and willingness to work on 
their own betterment.
In order for personal liberty to be respected, schools 
must have the opportunity to diversify their offering and 
to address more closely the different needs of children, 
as well as to provide them an appropriate environment 
to cultivate their own talents and peculiarities. The 
mechanisms of school choice in this article provide 
some examples of how the provision of education can 
be organized in order to respect individual liberty as 
defended by Hayek and Humboldt. There are many other 
mechanisms of decentralised governance that contribute to 
increased school autonomy and to parents’ and to students’ 
satisfaction—magnet schools, different systems of tuition 
tax credits or of competition between municipalities—
which can also be analysed under this perspective. And 
despite the moral concerns and the critiques of their 
efficiency, the general evaluation of these tools is positive, 
with the most recent studies on the subject not finding any 
harmful consequences for children.
The interaction and cooperation between individuals, 
which result from the combination of freedom with 
diversity, is fundamental in allowing the emergence of 
a spontaneous social order that respects individuality 
and that allows each one to pursue their own life-plans. 
As Humboldt (1854, p. 23) recognises, “the very variety 
arising from the union of numbers of individuals is the 
highest good which social life can confer, and this variety 
is undoubtedly merged into uniformity in proportion to the 
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NOTES
1 Given that Hayek’s political philosophy was constantly 
evolving, it is important to note that for this paper we 
are taking into account his views in the the 1960s.
2 Hayek provides us with examples such as dress code 
conventions.  
3  Under Hayek’s proposal, Hamowy explains, it would 
be compatible with individual freedom to be covered 
by a piece of legislation prescribing enslavement of 
each single male citizen for a given period of time and 
during a certain age.
4 See UCL 2017, where it is argued that government 
policies failed for the past decades to reduce racial 
segregation and continue to fail.
5  Cf. Nathan (1999) for a detailed and useful description 
of the emergence of the charter school movement and 
of the characterization of these schools, as well as of the 
reasons behind their creation.
6  Of these, three concluded that the school voucher 
system tends to favour African American students, 
while one concluded that it tends to favour low-
performing students (Miron and Urschel 2016).
7  Information regarding the latest data and studies on 
charter schools and their operation in the United States 
may be found on the website of the National Alliance 
for Public Charter Schools.
8  The Office for Standards in Education, Children’s 
Services and Skills is responsible for inspecting and 
regulating of educational services in the United 
Kingdom.
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